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INTRODUCTION
Environmental taxes and regulation reduce pollution by shifting behavior away from polluting activities, but they also encourage the development of new technologies that make pollution control less costly in the long run (Newel et al. 1999; Popp 2002) . Understanding of the response of technology to economic incentives -dubbed induced innovation or induced technological change (ITC) -will prove crucial for designing appropriate environmental policies (Jaffe et al. 2002) . In the literature, the subject of ITC has explicitly been studied in various theoretic models (e.g. Verdier 1995 , Beltratti 1997 , Newell et al. 1999 , Goulder and Matthai 2000 . In a slightly different strand of literature, a more general approach is followed when adapted endogenous growth models are used to investigate the effect of reduced resource use on growth (Gradus and Smulders 1993; Bovenberg and Smulders 1995; den Butter and Hofkes 1995; Bovenberg and Smulders 1996; Smulders 1999, Smulders and de Nooij 2003) . Many of these studies develop endogenous growth models with capital and/or labour, and a natural resource, most often energy, as factors of production, in which economic growth is generated through the accumulation of knowledge. Such models are advantageous when one aims to study the effect on growth of resource conservation rules. One conclusion emerging from these studies is that abatement measures can increase growth when they reduce pollution and pollution harms the production of knowledge. In most other cases, resource use reduction harms growth.
In this paper, we build an endogenous growth model, comparable with those used in the second strand of literature, with three sectors; the first sector produces the final good, the second a generic intermediate, and the third produces energy. The final good uses the generic intermediate and energy as production factors, and productivity of both inputs is endogenous through technology driven by research. Both the intermediate and energy sector use a capital-labor composite as production factor, and also for these sectors, productivity of the input depends on a technology variable that measures accumulated (and depreciated) research. A major difference with the average endogenous growth model that includes a resource, though, is that we model energy as an intermediate good. The energy production technology, and thus the energy production costs, is endogenous to the model. A second major difference is that our model is calibrated to reproduce the trends of the past decades in overall growth and energy efficiency improvement.
The model is used to carry out policy analyses that verify the role of ITC in climate change policy. It thereby contributes to the literature on induced technological change in the context of 3 climate change, which is a yet undecided debate (Carraro et al. 2003) . Various studies try to estimate the impact of ITC relative to the factor substitution effects without technological change through scenario analyses (Carraro and Galeotti 1997 , Grübler and Messner 1998 , Goulder and Schneider 1999 , Nordhaus 2002 , van der Zwaan et al. 2002 , Buonanno et al. 2003 , Gerlagh and van der Zwaan 2003 , Gerlagh and Lise, 2003 . But the estimated contribution of ITC varies considerably between the studies. Carraro and Galeotti (1997) employ an econometric model for the EU and come to an optimistic conclusion. ITC can bring about a double dividend when proper R&D incentives will reduce emissions without the need for decreasing consumption. Grübler and Messner (1998) use an energy-system model and conclude that ITC substantially decrease costs and warrant early emission reduction efforts. Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Nordhaus (2002) are more pessimistic and conclude that, though ITC is not negligible, its contribution to greenhouse gas emission abatement is small when compared to the contribution of factor substitution for given technology. Gerlagh and Lise (2003) consider two competing energy sources (i.e. renewables and carbon-rich energy sources). They show that induced technology change accelerates the substitution of carbon-free energy for fossil fuels substantially, and that in this setting, induced technological change is a powerful contributor to emission reductions.
One specific issue that we address in this paper is the question whether endogenous technological change (ETC) is beneficial to climate change policies. From the outset, such is not obvious. While ETC increases flexibility and thereby reduces costs, it can also increase costs when lower output levels lead to lower investments in learning. It is not unreasonable to assume that economic output will decrease more with endogenous technology, compared to a situation with an exogenous technological path. In this paper, we will verify whether costs of energy reductions increase or decrease when we account for endogenous technological change, and by how much. The approach is as follows. As in many other studies, we define scenarios in which policy sets an environmental target (i.e. atmospheric carbon emission concentration) with endogenous carbon taxes to reach the target. ITC is beneficial when costs of reaching this target decrease when modeling endogenous technological change, compared to a scenario in which technology follows a benchmark path set by the benchmark (or 'business as usual') scenario without environmental target. Our finding is important since most costs estimates for climate change policies assume given technology, and their estimates may be realistic when the ITC impact factor is minor, but it may be too pessimistic or too optimistic when the ITC impact factor is large.
When carrying out numerical scenario analyses, caution is warranted. We are aware of the limitations of the modeling approach we follow. In a certain way, we develop a cartoon model in the tradition of the highly stylized models developed in endogenous growth theory. The model explores some specific mechanisms, while abstracting from other mechanisms. Just to mention one feature, we neglect all taxes and other market distortions apart from carbon taxes. Still we 4 think our analysis can provide valuable qualitative insights on technological innovation as induced by climate change policy. Also, we attempt to reduce the sensitivity of our results with respect to specific model features as we calibrate the model such that it reproduces the recent past and produces a benchmark scenario that is in line with other studies.
Section 2 describes the basic features of the model. It describes the accumulation of knowledge and the linkage from energy use to climate change. Section 3 describes the calibration of the model. Section 4 provides the results of the simulations. The final section discusses the implications of our analysis for climate change policies. Two Appendices are added to the paper.
Appendix 1 presents the full list of model equations, including the first order conditions for the energy producers and innovators. The numerical parameter values, as found in the calibration procedure, are presented in Appendix 2.
MODEL SET UP
The model has 60 distinct time periods of five years, each denoted by t=1,…,60, covering the period 2000-2300. The model distinguishes one representative consumer, a representative production technology, and a public agent that can set emission taxes to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. There is one final good, or consumer good, for which prices are normalized to unity.
All other prices are measured relative to this good.
The representative consumer
We assume there is one representative consumer who maximises welfare subject to a budget constraint:
where W is total welfare, ρ is the pure time preference, and C t / P t is consumption per capita.
Production
Output of the final good is denoted by Y. The final good is made of a generic intermediate M and Capital depreciates at rate δ K , and accumulates through investments I, flow R j , the so-called fishing-out effect (Caballero and Jaffe 1993; Kortum 1993) .
where δ A is the share of knowledge that becomes obsolete in each period.
The model is closed by the commodity balance for the final good; output Y is used for consumption C, investments I, and research expenditures R.
where R is the aggregate research level,
6 Labour L t is supplied inelastically. We assume it is a fixed ratio of population, i.e. L t = γ P t with 0< γ <1 and P t is the total population. In turn, population is assumed to grow logistically:
where γ is the population growth rate for low population levels and P LT is the population level in the long term to which P t converges.
The model assumes complete and perfect markets for all goods, except for research. That is, the model imposes the first order conditions that follow from the welfare maximization program, presented in the appendix. For research, it is assumed that the marginal social value of research exceeds the marginal social costs by factor ω (Baumol 2002, p135) . For ω=1, the model would calculate a first-best allocation. For ω>1, the social benefits of research exceed the costs. Thus, there is a research externality in the model. This is important for climate change policies for the following reason. A policy measure that will increase the total research effort will tend to increase welfare, whereas a policy measure that decreases the overall research effort will tend to decrease welfare. It is not obvious, from the outset, whether climate change policy will increase or decrease total research.
Climate Change
Carbon dioxide emissions, Em t , are linked to the use of energy through an emission intensity parameter ε t that describes the level of emissions per unit of energy use:
We assume that emission intensity of energy use and energy efficiency of production improves (so-called energy-efficiency improvement or EEI) autonomously over time. Carbon emissions are linked to the atmospheric carbon concentration, which in turn determines the global average surface temperature. The carbon cycle dynamics assumed in our model are simple and follow the approximations supposed in DICE (Nordhaus, 1994) and DEMETER (Gerlagh and Van der Zwaan, 2003) . The link between carbon emissions, atmospheric carbon concentration ATM t and the global surface temperature, TEMP t , is a "1-box representation":
where δ M is the atmospheric CO 2 depreciation rate, ATM o is the pre-industrial atmospheric CO 2 concentration, 1-δ E is the retention rate, Ēm t are emissions not linked to energy production , δ T is the temperature adjustment rate resulting form the atmospheric warmth capacity, and TEMP o is the long-run equilibrium temperature change associated with a doubling of the atmospheric CO 2 concentration. The model version used for this paper does not specify a damage function, though such an equation can simply be added. The reason is that damage estimates are subject to normative debates on the valuation of environmental losses, and we attempt to keep away from these discussions. Instead, we will run cost-effective analyses that assume a certain climate change target.
To reach climate change targets, the public agent may levy a tax τ t on emissions Em t produced by the final good sector when using energy. The public agent may levy a tax on emissions produced by the final good producer when using energy in production. This carbon tax is a fee expressed in $/tC, τ E,t , and it adds a constant markup value to the energy users costs,
where q τ t is the price of energy including the carbon tax, q t is the production costs of energy, and ε t the emission intensity as defined in equation (11). We assume that the public agent is budget neutral in the case of a tax policy, so that, on the other hand, if a carbon tax is levied, i.e. τ t >0, the generic intermediate M is subsidized with a rate s M,t 
where µ τ t is the intermediate price of M including the subsidy. The carbon tax revenues and the total amount of subsidies are in balance:
Alternatively, we could assume that carbon tax revenues are recycled by research subsidies, but this would produce a bias in our results in favor of carbon taxes. Under our central assumption of research externality ω>1, even without carbon taxes, a subsidy on research would increase total welfare. Selling an innovation subsidy as a natural by-product of carbon taxes mixes up climate change policies and generic research policies.
CALIBRATION
We use the model outlined above to carry out a numerical simulation where model parameters are Variables that are used as an input in the calibration process are population (P), labor (L) population growth (g L ), output or GDP (Y), GDP growth rate (g Y ), gross investments (I), the capital stock (K), total primary energy supply and total primary energy use measured in Exa
Joules (E), the energy price in $/GJ (q) and its growth rate (g q ), the energy-efficiency improvement (EEI), CO 2 emissions (Em), the decline in the emission intensity of energy (g ε ),
overall research expenditures (R), and the real interest rate. These 15 data points are used to calibrate the 17 parameters In 2000, the world population (P 2007 ) is 6.1 billion people, and its growth rate is 1.2%. In the long run, the world population is assumed to stabilize at a level of 11.4 billion people (as in World Bank, 1999; and Nakicenovic et al. 1998; and Gerlagh and Van der Zwaan, 2003) . We assume that labor force is a fixed rate of population, i.e. γ=0.48, as indicated by the most recent WDI data.
We calculated per capita GWP in 2000 at 5.800 US$(1995), and the trend of the per capita GWP growth rate at 1.7% per year. In 2000, total energy use is estimated at 326 EJ per year. The energy intensity (ratio of energy use over GDP) is approximately 10.5 GJ/$, and on basis of the 1971-1991 WDI sample, we estimate the Energy Efficiency Improvement (EEI) at 1% per year. The initial average price of energy (q) is assumed to be 2.7 US$(1995)/GJ, and almost constant. The autonomous improvement of the emission intensity is 0.2% per year, and for the year 2000, the emission intensity is estimated at 0.0155 kgC/GJ. The CO 2 emissions (Em 2000 ) amount to almost 6
Gigaton carbon (GtC) per year.
SIMULATION RESULTS

Policy Scenarios
This section presents and discusses the results with the calibrated model. After the calibration stage, we use the model for simulations. The simulation model runs for 60 time steps of 5 years each, representing the period 2000-2300, though the presentation of data and figures will be restricted to the first two centuries 2000-2200. State variables (knowledge and capital stocks) are fixed at the beginning of this period. We have simulated four scenarios. First, the BAU scenario assumes the absence of carbon taxes.
In the second scenario, policy makers are supposed to employ the carbon tax instrument such that total research expenditures are maximized. That is, the carbon tax is not used to combat emissions, but to increase welfare derived from the consumption of final goods. The background to this policy is the understanding that a carbon tax supported by a subsidy on the intermediate M might increase the overall research effort, or decrease the overall research effort, and it is not known in advance which of the two possibilities holds. In case the overall research level is increased, this will increase welfare since the marginal social benefits of research exceed the marginal social costs by factor ω>1. Whether a carbon tax will increase or decrease the overall research levels cannot be concluded in advance, it depends on parameter values that follow from the calibration process. The second scenario is labeled MAXW.
Then, we consider two stabilization scenarios, labeled 450_ITC and 450_NOITC that target the atmospheric carbon concentration level at 450 ppmv. In the BAU scenario, this carbon concentration level will be reached around 2050. In both stabilization scenarios, there is a variable carbon tax (in $/tC) levied on energy use to achieve the target. Figure 1 plots the emission levels and Figure 2 plots the associated carbon concentration levels. Figure 1 shows that, for our simple 1-box atmospheric model, the 450 ppmv target is consistent with long-term constant annual emissions of about 3.2 GtC. Comparison of the third and fourth scenario can show us the importance of induced technological change relative to factor substitution that happens with the benchmark technological change path.
Scenario Results
From the comparison of the four scenarios, we will draw conclusions with respect to the relation between ETC and (i) the timing of emission reductions, (ii) the carbon tax levels required to reach climate stabilization targets, (iii) the costs of meeting the climate change constraints, and (iv) the direction of technological change.
From Figure 1 , the first outstanding conclusion is that the endogenous growth model suggests a win-win policy exists. The second scenario, which maximizes welfare abstracting from climate change costs, results in lower emission levels compared to the benchmark. A modest carbon tax ( Figure 3 and Figure 4 ) raises expenditures in energy savings R&D ( Figure 7 ) and lowers expenditures for energy production R&D (Figure 9 ). The overall R&D expenditures are lifted by 0.04% of GDP. Given that the social benefits of R&D exceed the costs, consumption increases, by 0.19% in 2050 and by 0.26% in 2100 (Figure 6 ).
The second conclusion we draw from Figure 1 and Figure 2 is that ITC (the third scenario)
implies a slight advancement of emission reductions, compared to the fourth scenario without ITC. In Figure 2 , the two graphs for the two scenarios are almost on top of one another, but in not seem realistic from a political perspective. In the longer term, however, we can expect the substitution between carbon rich and carbon poor energy sources to contribute substantially to emission reductions ) and long-term carbon taxes required to meet the climate change constraints will substantially be cut. 
FIGURE 3. Carbon tax FIGURE 4. Carbon tax for first five decades
The effect of ITC on the costs of climate change targets is even stronger than its effect on the elasticity of emissions. Figure 5 shows the development of consumption per capita, and Figure 6 shows the same path, but now relative to the benchmark BAU scenario. The first figure shows that, on the scale of long-term income growth, costs of meeting climate change targets are almost negligible. Azar and Schneider (2003) and Gerlagh and Papyrakis (2003) discuss the relevance of this finding, which is a common feature found in many analyses with IAMs. Figure 6 shows that, notwithstanding the small size of the costs compared to the overall income growth, costs are still substantial and significantly different between the two scenarios with and without ITC.
Abstracting from ITC, the emission reduction by about two-third, in the 22 nd century, decreases output and consumption by about 5%. When technology adjusts, costs decrease to below 1% of GDP. When calculating the costs in terms of the welfare measure as defined in (1), we find that ITC decreases the costs by factor 11.8. Thus, studies based on inflexible technology may vastly overestimate long-term costs of energy savings. Comparing the two knowledge stocks, we see that the carbon tax shifts knowledge from efficient energy production to efficient energy use. We also mention that the R&D levels for the generic productivity of M is almost unaffected (not shown in a graph). In the climate change constrained scenario, energy production is less efficient than in the benchmark scenario, but energy use is more efficient. Costs involved in this shift of knowledge are small, compared to costs involved in factor substitution.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have built an endogenous growth model with three sectors, and with endogenous technology for each of the sectors. The first sector produces the final good, the second a generic intermediate, and the third produces energy. Energy production and use lead to emissions of carbon dioxide, and the model contains a simple climate change module that links emissions to atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration levels and temperature change. This module can also be used inversely to define a window of emission paths that are consistent with an exogenous climate change target, such as an atmospheric 450 ppmv ceiling.
We have used numerical simulations to study the potential for a double dividend, that is, a reduction in emissions and increase in output, at the same time. Climate change policy can bring about a double dividend when an energy savings policy increases the R&D level in certain sectors more than it decreases the R&D level in other sectors, assuming that social returns to R&D are the same in both sectors. Indeed, when parameter values where calibrated to match the 1970-2000 growth levels for output and energy use, we found a double dividend for modest energy savings.
Yet when energy savings were more stringent to be consistent with a 450 ppmv stabilization target economic growth fell.
The model is also used to carry out policy analyses that verify the specific role of ITC in climate change policy. We conclude from the results that ITC's contribution to greenhouse gas emission abatement can be substantial. In our calculations, the elasticity of emissions to a carbon tax doubles, and the costs of emission reductions drop by approximately factor 10. In this setting, induced technological change proves a powerful contributor to emission reductions.
Our finding is important since most cost estimates for climate change policies assume given technology, and their estimates may be too pessimistic. There are two apparent qualifications to be made. First, results crucially depend on parameter values, which do not only depend on growth rates over the period on which the model is calibrated for output and energy use, but which also depend on various assumptions such as on the relative value of research expenditures and the 14 social rate of return on research. For future work, it is essential to gather more data that allow us a more robust calibration procedure. Second, the model assumes a long-term planning and cooperation on a global scale. When climate change targets are set on a shorter horizon and cooperation is incomplete, such as under the Kyoto Protocol, technology will be less adaptive and climate change policy costs increase.
Having said this, we want to emphasize that not all results are sensitive. It seems intuitive that a carbon tax will shift innovations between sectors, from sectors that are responsible for fossil fuel energy production to sectors that are responsible for energy savings and carbon-free energy production. It is this shift in research that will drive most of the long-term cost reductions for climate change mitigation policies. This also points to an important caveat in the current study.
Inclusion of carbon capturing and sequestration and carbon-free energy sources is an apparent subject for further work.
APPENDIX 1. FIRST ORDER CONDITIONS FOR FIRMS' PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
We use β t as the price deflator for the final good from period t to period t+1. So, β t = 1/(1+r t ), where r t is the real interest rate. Welfare optimisation gives the Ramsey rule as a first-ordercondition for consumption,
The first order conditions for
and I are, respectively,
In a first-best optimum, we would have ω=1. As explained in the main text, however, it is assumed that in market equilibrium, ω=4.
Carbon tax scenario
In the case of a carbon tax scenario, equations (18) and (19)become
Complete model
The complete model consists of the 21 endogenous variables:
, and 1 price deflator β. The model has and 30 equations: (1)- (6), 4x (7), (9)- (8), (11)- (13), (17), (18)- (26), 4x(27), (28). The model has 2 exogenous variables, P, L, and 16 economic parameters, ρ, σ, ς M , ς E , α, δ K , δ A , 4xζ j , 4xη j , ω and 5 climate change parameters, 
